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We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We
are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an e￿cient way and induce the
agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, ￿rst we char-
acterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-de￿cit condition and
characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian-
equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.
JEL Classi￿cations: C79, D61, D63.
Key words: fairness, allocation of indivisible goods and money, task assignments,
strategy-proofness, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy,
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1 INTRODUCTION
We study problems where a principal, which we call the \center", has to allocate heterogeneous
tasks among agents based on the costs the agents incur for performing the tasks. The center may
be a social planner (government) which pursues goals like e￿ciency and fairness. In order to
induce the agents to report their costs truthfully, the center must o￿er them incentives: money
transfers are made between the center and the agents. Agents have preferences over the sets of
tasks and transfers. We assume that preferences are represented by quasi-linear utility functions,
all tasks must be allocated, each task is assigned to only one agent; and there is no restriction
on the number of tasks or the size of the transfer an agent can be assigned.
Examples to this task assignment problem include job and wage assignments and imposition
of tasks on agents. Speci￿c cases of the last example are government requisitions and eminent
domain proceedings (see Yengin, 2010a). However, our results can be easily extended to a
more general setting where heterogeneous desirable objects are allocated among a ￿nite set of
agents whose valuations for the objects are their private information and monetary transfers are
allowed. Among the many real life examples are auctions, the allocation of donated goods and
money among the needy, the allocation of inheritance among heirs, the allocation of landing
rights to airlines, and the allocation of water entitlements, ￿shing and pollution permits.
￿The ￿rst draft of this paper was written while I was a Ph.D. student at the University of Rochester. I am
grateful to William Thomson for his guidance and advice. I also thank Paulo Barelli and G￿ abor Vir￿ ag, and two
anonymous referees for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was titled "Fairness in Auctions
and Task Assignments".
ySchool of Economics, The University of Adelaide, Napier Building, Room G 34, SA 5005, Australia; e-mail:
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1A mechanism determines who is assigned which tasks and what the transfers are. Our aim
is to design mechanisms that attain three essential goals: e￿ciency, immunity to manipulations,
and equity.
In terms of e￿ciency, we are interested in mechanisms that assign the tasks such that the
total cost incurred by the agents is minimal1 (assignment-e￿ciency).
Agents may manipulate the allocation in their favor by misrepresenting their costs. Hence,
an assignment-e￿cient mechanism can only minimize the actual total cost if the mechanism is
immune to such manipulations. Strategy-proofness requires that truthful revelation of costs be
a dominant strategy for all agents.
The equity concept we consider here, egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler; 1978),
is arguably, one of the main fairness notions that has been extensively studied in the fair alloca-
tion literature. Fairness is especially important when tasks are imposed on agents (against their
will) as in eminent domain proceedings. Also, when agents have equal rights over the allocated
objects, government is concerned about the fairness of the allocation. Examples to this case
include allocation of donated goods among the needy, auctions held to allocate water licences
among the farmers, allocation of pollution permits to factories and so on.
We have in mind situations where agents have equal rights over the resources or equal respon-
sibilities over the completion of tasks. In cases like these, assigning each agent the same bundle
might be seen as fair. However, since tasks are heterogeneous, such an allocation composed of
identical bundles is not possible in general. Then, an alternative way to ensure fairness is to
choose a feasible allocation that is Pareto-indi￿erent to an identical-bundle allocation. A mech-
anism is egalitarian-equivalent if for each economy, it chooses a feasible allocation that leaves
each agent indi￿erent between her assigned bundle and a common reference bundle composed
of a reference set of tasks and a reference transfer.2
Another perspective that would lead to egalitarian-equivalence as an equity concept is the
liberal-egalitarian theory of justice:
Suppose every agent were assigned the same bundle. Then, the utility di￿erences of agents
would be solely due to the di￿erences in their cost functions (i.e., preferences). If agents are
held responsible for their costs (preferences), but not for the heterogeneity in the resources,
then this allocation would be fair. Since an allocation composed of identical bundles may not
exist, an alternative to support this liberal-egalitarian notion is to use an egalitarian-equivalent
mechanism.3
It is well known that in the class of problems we study, the so called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms (simply referred to as the Groves mechanisms) are the only mechanisms satis-
fying the ￿rst two goals we want to achieve: assignment-e￿ciency and strategy-proofness.
Adding equity as an additional requirement leads to our ￿rst result: characterization of the
class of egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms. Egalitarian-equivalence can be strengthen
by requiring the same set of tasks, say A; to be the reference set of tasks for all economies
(A￿egalitarian-equivalence). Our main Theorem demonstrates a surprising fact: although in
general A￿egalitarian-equivalence is stronger than egalitarian-equivalence, when Groves mecha-
nisms are considered, these two notions coincide. This result simpli￿es the design of egalitarian-
equivalent Groves mechanisms.
By Green and La￿ont (1977), no Groves mechanism balances the budget. Still, it is possible
1In case of desirable objects, the total value experienced by all agents should be maximized.
2The reference bundle is common for all agents in a given economy. For di￿erent economies, di￿erent reference
bundles can be chosen.
3Egalitarian-equivalence can be related to the idea of \equality of resources" (Dworkin, 2000). For a more
detailed philosophical motivation for egalitarian-equivalence based on the liberal-egalitarian distributive theory
of justice, see Yengin (2010a).
2to design egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms that generate bounded budget de￿cits. Our
second result characterizes the class of such mechanisms. Among the egalitarian-equivalent
Groves mechanisms that respect the same upper bound on de￿cit, we specify the Pareto-
dominant ones. These mechanisms are necessarily ;￿egalitarian-equivalent.
Finally, we analyze the relations between the egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms and
Groves mechanisms satisfying other fairness notions, such as no-envy or order-preservation. We
￿nd out that under assignment-e￿ciency and strategy-proofness, interesting logical relations
hold between several fairness notions that do not exist otherwise.
The analysis of the Groves mechanisms from the fairness perspective has been the object
of only few recent papers. In Yengin (2010a), we introduce the class of Super-Fair Groves
mechanisms and characterize this class with several sets of fairness axioms (one of which is
egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy). In the same model as ours where heterogeneous objects
are allocated, P￿ apai (2003) characterizes envy-free (no agent prefers another agent’s bundle
to her own) Groves mechanisms. Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2004) introduce a class of
Groves mechanisms that respect a welfare lower bound based on Rawl’s maximin equity criterion
(k￿fairness) and Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) characterize this class. Yengin (2010b) consid-
ers several welfare bounds (including the identical-preferences lower-bound) and characterizes
Groves mechanisms that respect them.
In Section 2, we present the model and de￿ne the Groves mechanisms. In Section 3, we char-
acterize egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms. In Section 4, we investigate the implications
of imposing an upper-bound on the de￿cit. Section 5 analyses the relations between di￿erent
classes of Groves mechanisms. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
A ￿nite set of indivisible tasks is to be allocated among a ￿nite set of agents. All tasks must be
allocated. An agent can be assigned either no task, a single task, or more than one task. Each
task is assigned to only one agent. Let A be the ￿nite set of tasks, with jAj ￿ 1:
There are n ￿ 2 agents, let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of n agents. The number of agents
may be smaller than, equal to, or greater than the number of tasks.
Let 2A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent i has a cost function ci : 2A ! R+ with
ci(;) = 0.4 Let C be the set of such cost functions and CN be the n￿fold Cartesian product of
C:
A cost pro￿le is a list c ￿ (c1;:::;cn) 2 CN where for each i 2 N; ci 2 C. A cost pro￿le de￿nes
an economy. For each i 2 N; let c￿i be the list of the cost functions of the agents in Nnfig: For
each N0 ￿ N; let c￿N0 be the list of the cost functions of the agents in NnN0:
There is a perfectly divisible good we call \money". Let ti denote agent i0s consumption of
the good. We call ti agent i0s transfer: if ti > 0; it is a transfer from the center to i; if ti < 0;
jtij is a transfer from i to the center.
Agent i’s utility when she is assigned the set of tasks Ai 2 2A (note that Ai may be empty)
and consumes ti 2 R is
u(Ai;ti;ci) = ￿ci(Ai) + ti:
Let A = f(A0
i)i2N : for each i 2 N; A0
i 2 2A; for each pair fi;jg ￿ N; A0
i \ A0




An assignment is a list (Ai)i2N 2 A: A transfer pro￿le is a list (ti)i2N 2 RN. An allocation
is a list (Ai;ti)i2N where (Ai)i2N is an assignment and (ti)i2N is a transfer pro￿le:
4As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
3A mechanism is a function ’ ￿ (A;t) de￿ned over CN that associates with each economy an
allocation: for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N, ’i(c) ￿ (Ai(c);ti(c)) 2 2A ￿ R:










2.1 The Groves Mechanisms
Since the utility of each agent is increasing in her transfer, and her transfer and the total
transfer can be of any size, every allocation is Pareto-dominated by some other allocation with
higher transfers. That is, no allocation is Pareto-e￿cient. Still, we can de￿ne a notion of
e￿ciency restricted to the assignment of the tasks. Since utilities are quasi-linear, given an
economy; an allocation that minimizes the total cost incurred by all agents is Pareto-e￿cient
for that economy among all allocations with the same, or smaller, total transfer. A mechanism
is assignment-e￿cient if it chooses only such allocations.




For each c 2 CN, let A￿(c) be the set of e￿cient assignments for c:
An assignment-e￿cient mechanism assigns the tasks so that the actual total cost is minimal
if the agents report their true costs. Strategy-proofness requires that no agent ever bene￿ts by
misrepresenting her costs (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).




The so called Groves mechanisms were introduced by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and
Groves (1973). A Groves mechanism chooses, for each economy, an e￿cient assignment of the
tasks. In the literature, Groves mechanisms are sometimes de￿ned as correspondences that select
all the e￿cient assignments in an economy. We work with single-valued Groves mechanisms and
assume that each Groves mechanism is associated with a tie-breaking rule that determines which
of the e￿cient assignments (if there are more than one) is chosen. Let T be the set of all possible
tie-breaking rules and ￿ be a typical element of this set.
The transfer of each agent determined by a Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each
agent pays the total cost incurred by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism.
Second, each agent receives an amount of money that does not depend on her own cost. For each
i 2 N; let hi be a real-valued function de￿ned over CN such that for each c 2 CN; hi depends
only on c￿i: Let h = (hi)i2N and H be the set of all such h:
The Groves mechanism associated with h 2 H and ￿ 2 T , Gh;￿: Let Gh;￿ ￿ (A￿;th;￿)
be such that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N,
A￿(c) 2 A￿(c)









The following result will be of much use.
Lemma 1. For each c 2 CN and each i 2 N,
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c) + hi(c￿i):
By Lemma 1, for each h 2 H; the mechanisms in fGh;￿g￿2T are Pareto-indi￿erent.6 Hence,
the particular tie-breaking rule used is irrelevant in the determination of the utilities.
The following theorem justi￿es our interest in Groves mechanisms.
Theorem A A mechanism is assignment-e￿cient and strategy-proof if and only if it is a
Groves mechanism.
Proof: Since CN is convex, the proof follows from Holmstr￿ om (1979). 2
3 Egalitarian-Equivalence
If agents are equally responsible for the completion of the tasks, then assigning them identical
bundles would be fair. But such an identical-bundle allocation is not possible in general due
to the heterogeneity in tasks. Fortunately, in our model, we can always ￿nd an allocation
such that each agent is indi￿erent between her assigned bundle and a common reference bundle
(consisting of a reference set of tasks and a reference transfer). Egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1978) requires that only such allocations be chosen.
Egalitarian-equivalence: For each c 2 CN, there is a set of tasks (which may be empty)
R 2 2A and a transfer r 2 R such that for each i 2 N;
u(’i(c);ci) = u(R;r;ci):
To characterize the egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms, we need the following
notation.
Notation 1
(a) For each i 2 N; let c0
i 2 C be such that for each A 2 2A; c0
i(A) = 0: Let c0 = (c0
i)i2N:
(b) Let ￿ ￿ f￿j￿ : N ! f1;2;:::;ng is a bijectiong:
For each i 2 N; let ￿i 2 ￿ be a permutation where agent i comes last. For each i 2 N; let
￿i = f￿i 2 ￿ : ￿i(i) = ng be the set of all such permutations.
For instance, if N = f1;2g; then there are two possible permutations of agents, ￿1 and ￿2 :
in ￿1; agent 2 comes ￿rst and in ￿2; she comes last. Hence, ￿ = f￿1;￿2g where ￿1(2) = 1;
￿1(1) = 2, ￿2(1) = 1; and ￿2(2) = 2:





ci if ￿(i) ￿ ￿(j),
c0
i if ￿(i) > ￿(j):
6Let c 2 C









i;ci): The mechanisms ’ and ’
0 are Pareto-indi￿erent if for each c 2 C




5That is, c￿;j is an economy where we permute the agents according to ￿, and any agent i
who comes after agent j in this permutation has a cost function c0
i; and all other agents’ cost
functions are same as in cost pro￿le c: For instance, let ￿￿ 2 ￿ be such that for each i 2 N;




If a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent, then for each c 2 CN; it selects an alloca-
tion that is Pareto-indi￿erent to a reference bundle (R(c);r(c)). That is, there are functions
R : CN!2A and r : CN!R which associate each economy with a reference set of tasks and
a reference transfer, respectively. The following result is a direct implication of egalitarian-
equivalence and Lemma 1:
Lemma 2. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent if and only if there is a reference-
set-of-tasks-function R : CN!2A and a reference-transfer-function r : CN!R such that for each
c 2 CN and each i 2 N;
hi(c￿i) = W(c) + r(c) ￿ ci (R(c)): (1)
Suppose we pick any two arbitrary functions R : CN!2A and r : CN!R and use them to
compute the right-hand-side (RHS) of (1). Then, we can not guarantee that for each c 2 CN and
each i 2 N; hi(c￿i)is independent of ci: Hence, Lemma 2 does not hold for any two arbitrary
functions R and r. To guarantee the independence of hi from ci, functions R and r should satisfy
condition (2) below:
For each c 2 CN, each i 2 N, and each b c 2 CN such that c￿i = b c￿i; since hi(c￿i) = hi(b c￿i);
by (1),
W(c) + r(c) ￿ ci (R(c)) = W(b ci;c￿i) + r(b ci;c￿i) ￿ b ci (R(b ci;c￿i)): (2)
If we characterize the set of admissible R and r functions for which (2) holds, then we can
construct any egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism by using (1). To design such admissible
functions R and r associated with an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism, we can check
whether (2) holds for each c 2 CN, each i 2 N, and each b c 2 CN such that c￿i = b c￿i. A less
time consuming alternative method is to ￿x a benchmark economy such as c0 and utilize the
n￿step iteration method we describe below.
The n-step Process:
Let Gh;￿ be an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism. Then, by Lemma 2, there are
R : CN!2A and r : CN!R such that (1) holds. Pick any economy c 2 CN: Starting from c0; we
can reach c in n steps, at each step k ￿ n; changing the cost function of agent k from c0
k to ck:
Let ck denote the economy obtained at step k ￿ n: That is, by Notation 1c, ck ￿ c￿￿;k.
Note that at each step k ￿ n; ck￿1
￿k = ck
￿k: Hence, by (2); we will connect the reference
transfer of ck￿1 to that of ck:
Step 1: Consider c0 = (c0
1;c0
2;:::;c0







￿1): By (2), W(c0)+r(c0)￿c0
1(R(c0)) = W(c1)+r(c1)￿c1(R(c1)):
Note that in c0 and c1; the minimal total cost is achieved by assigning all the tasks to one of
the agents, say i; whose cost function is c0
i: Hence, W(c0) = W(c1) = 0: Also, c0
1(R(c0)) = 0:
Hence, r(c1) = r(c0) + c1(R(c1)):
Let k ￿ n ￿ 1:
Step k: Consider ck￿1 = (c1;c2;:::;ck￿1;c0
k;c0
k+1;:::;c0







￿k; by (2), r(ck) = r(ck￿1) + W(ck￿1) ￿ W(ck) + ck(R(ck)) ￿ c0
k(R(ck￿1)): Note
that W(ck￿1) = W(ck) = c0
k(R(ck￿1)) = 0: Hence,
r(ck) = r(ck￿1) + ck(R(ck)):
Since this equation holds for each 1 ￿ k ￿ n ￿ 1; by recursive substitution, we get




Step n: Consider cn￿1 = (c1;c2;:::;cn￿1;c0
n) and cn = c:
Since cn￿1
￿n = c￿n; by (2), r(c) = r(cn￿1)+W(cn￿1)￿W(c)+cn(R(c))￿c0
n(R(cn￿1)): Note that
W(cn￿1) = c0
n(R(cn￿1)) = 0: Hence, by (3),
r(c) = r(c0) +
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿￿;j)) ￿ W(c): (4)
3
Instead of ￿￿; we could have used any permutation of agents and applied the same n￿step
process (for the formal proof, see the proof of Proposition 1). For instance, if n ￿ 9 and we use
￿ where ￿(3) = 1, ￿(9) = 2 etc., then, at step 1; we change the cost function of agent 3 from
c0
3 to c3; and in the second step, we change the cost function of agent 9, and so on. Hence (4)
holds for any ￿ 2 ￿: That is, for each ￿ 2 ￿;
r(c) = r(c0) +
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿;j)) ￿ W(c): (5)
By (5), for each pair f￿;￿0g ￿ ￿;
X
j2N




Hence, the functions R : CN!2A for which Lemma 2 holds must be as in the following de￿nition.







Let R be the set of all functions R satisfying (6). 3
Lemma 2 states that if a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent, then there are functions
R and r such that (1) holds. We showed that (1) implies (2) which in turn implies, through the
n￿step process, (5) and (6). Hence, by substituting (5) into (1), we get the following result.
Let ￿ ￿ r(c0):
Lemma 3. If a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent, then there is R 2 R and a
real number ￿ 2 R such that for each c 2 CN; each i 2 N; and each ￿ 2 ￿;
hi(c￿i) = ￿ +
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿;j)) ￿ ci(R(c)): (7)
7At ￿rst glance, since R depends on c; RHS of (7) seems to depend on ci (the same can be said
for equation (1)): This would contradict the fact that hi(c￿i) is independent of ci: However, this
is not the case due to the n-step process and (6). Next remark explains this fact (see Appendix
for the proof).
Remark 1. Let h 2 H be as in (7). Then, for each i 2 N and each pair fc;b cg ￿ CN with
c￿i = b c￿i; hi(c￿i) = hi(b c￿i):
Note that for each c 2 CN; each i 2 N; and each ￿i 2 ￿i; c￿i;i = c: If we use ￿i in (7), we
get equation (8) in the next de￿nition.
De￿nition 2. For each R 2 R, each real number ￿ 2 R; and each ￿ 2 T ; let GR;￿;￿ ￿ Gh;￿
where h is such that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N,




Let G ￿ fGR;￿;￿j R 2 R; ￿ 2 R; ￿ 2 T g be the class of all such mechanisms.
The following example illustrates (8).
Example 1. Let N = f1;2g: Let c = (c1;c2) 2 CN: Then, c￿1; 1 = c; c￿1; 2 = (c0
1;c2); c￿2; 1 =
(c1;c0
2); and c￿2; 2 = c:
Let GR;￿;￿ 2 G. By (8), h1(c2) = ￿ + c2(R(c0
1;c2)) and h2(c1) = ￿ + c1(R(c1;c0
2)):
Each mechanism GR;￿;￿ in G selects, for each economy c 2 CN; an allocation that is Pareto-
indi￿erent to the reference bundle (R(c);r(c)) where the reference set of tasks is chosen by R 2 R
and the reference transfer satis￿es (5) with ￿ = r(c0): That is, if we pick a real number ￿ and ￿x
￿ = r(c0); and pick a function R satisfying (6), then a Groves mechanism associated with these
￿ and R; through (8), must be egalitarian-equivalent. Also, any egalitarian-equivalent Groves
mechanism can be constructed this way.
Proposition 1. Class G is the class of all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms.
In Lemma 2, we did not have any information about the form of the admissible functions R
and r for which (1) works. We saw that arbitrary functions R and r can not be used. So (1)
was not very informative. However, by Proposition 1, we just need to search for a function R
that satis￿es (6) to construct an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism using (8).
So far, we have not said anything about the exact form of the functions in R except for that
they satisfy (6). Note that R is non-empty since it includes all functions R which select the
same set of tasks as the reference set for all economies. If such a function is used, we have the
following strengthening of egalitarian-equivalence:
Let A 2 2A.
A￿Egalitarian-equivalence: For each c 2 CN, there is r 2 R such that for each i 2 N;
u(’i(c);ci) = u((A;r);ci):
A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is A￿egalitarian-equivalent if and only if there is ￿ 2 R such that
Gh;￿ ￿ GR;￿;￿ where for each c 2 CN; R(c) = A: In particular, for each c 2 CN; each ￿ 2 ￿; and
each j 2 N; R(c￿;j) = A: Hence, by (8), we have the following Corollary to Proposition 1.
8Corollary 1. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is A￿egalitarian-equivalent if and only if there is a
real number ￿ 2 R such that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N;




For each A 2 2A; let GA be the class of all A￿egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms and G￿ =
fGA : A 2 2Ag:
Since A￿egalitarian-equivalence implies egalitarian-equivalence, if we pick A 2 2A and a real
number ￿ 2 R; we can design an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism using (9). Our main
Theorem next states that we can design all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in this
way. Hence, we obtain a surprising result: even though in general, A￿egalitarian-equivalence is
stronger than egalitarian-equivalence, a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent if and only
if it is A￿egalitarian-equivalent for some A 2 2A: That is, G ￿ G￿:
Theorem 1. A Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent if and only if it belongs to G￿:
Let us give some intuition for the proof of Theorem 1. The proof extensively relies on
equation (6), in particular, the fact that (6) implies the following: for any given c￿i; it is always
possible to ￿nd a cost function ci such that R(c￿;i) = R(c￿0;i): For instance, when N = f1;2g;
equation (6) implies that (i) c1(R(c1;c2)) + c2(R(c0
1;c2)) = c1(R(c1;c0
2)) + c2(R(c1;c2)): For a
given c2; there exists c1 such that equation (i) is violated unless R(c1;c2) = R(c1;c0
2); which in
turn implies that c2(R(c0
1;c2)) = c2(R(c1;c2)):
Note that Theorem 1 does not imply that the R function associated with a Groves mechanism
in G￿ must be constant. For instance, consider R : CN!2A such that R(c0) = A and for each
c 2 CNnfc0g; R(c) = ;: Then, for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; hi(c￿i) = ￿ and Gh;￿ is
;￿egalitarian-equivalent
In the class of two-agent economies, the transfer function of an A￿egalitarian-equivalent
Groves mechanism resembles that of a Pivotal mechanism. Remember that a Groves mechanism
Gh;￿ is Pivotal7 if for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; hi(c￿i) = W(c￿i): Since for each N = fi;jg
and each c 2 CN; W(c￿i) = cj(A); we have the following result:
Remark 2. On the class of two-agent economies, a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is A￿egalitarian-
equivalent if and only if there is ￿ 2 R such that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N;
hi(c￿i) = ￿ + W(c￿i):
4 Egalitarian-Equivalent Mechanisms with Bounded De￿cits
If the center wants to use a mechanism that allocates the objects e￿ciently and induces the
agents to report their true preferences, then it has to select a Groves mechanism. However,
one often is also interested in the amount of budget de￿cit or surplus that is generated by the
mechanism. It is well-known that no Groves mechanism balances the budget (Green and La￿ont,
1977). However, we can design Groves mechanisms that respect an upper bound on the de￿cit
generated.
7In the literature, these mechanisms are also known by the following names: Vickrey mechanisms, Clarke
mechanisms, and Second-price sealed-bid auctions.
9Suppose that the center is willing to incur a de￿cit up to a certain amount T 2 R (T may
be negative). The following condition requires that the de￿cit in any economy, no matter what
the costs of the agents in N; should never exceed T:




The revenue (budget surplus) of the center is equal to the negative of the total trans-





i (c) ￿ ￿T: That is, the center is guaranteed to generate a revenue at least as much
as ￿T: Note that such a guarantee is absent when a Pivotal mechanism is used.
In a related model to ours, Ohseto (2004) characterizes the class of ;￿egalitarian-equivalent
Groves mechanisms that respect T￿bounded-de￿cit.
Ohseto’s model di￿ers from the one we study in three important respects: in his model, the
indivisible goods are homogenous (i.e., the cost of each task is same for an agent), the number
of goods is strictly less than the number of agents, and each agent can be assigned at most one
indivisible good.
Ohseto’s Theorem 3 (stated for the undesirable objects) is the following:
A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ satis￿es ;￿egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded de￿cit if and
only if for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; hi(c￿i) ￿ T
jNj:
We can show that not only his result still holds in our more general setting, but moreover, that
even if we weaken the ;￿egalitarian-equivalence to egalitarian-equivalence, we still characterize
the same class of Groves mechanisms as stated in our next result.
Note that a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent if and only if Gh;￿ 2 G;:
Then, the transfer function is of the following form: there is ￿ 2 R such that for each c 2 CN
and each i 2 N; hi(c￿i) = ￿ and t
h;￿





For each ￿ 2 R; let S￿ ￿ fGh;￿jfor each c 2 CN and each i 2 N, hi(c￿i) = ￿; and ￿ 2 T g:
Proposition 2. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ satis￿es egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded-





By Corollary 1, an interesting implication of Proposition 2 is the following: assignment-
e￿ciency, strategy-proofness, egalitarian-equivalence, and T￿bounded-de￿cit together imply
;￿egalitarian-equivalence.
Remark 3. If an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism satis￿es T￿bounded-de￿cit, then it
is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent.
Note that a mechanism generates no-de￿cit if it satis￿es T￿bounded de￿cit where T = 0:
The following result follows from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ satis￿es egalitarian-equivalence and generates no-
de￿cit if and only if there is ￿ 2 R such that Gh;￿ 2 S￿ and
￿ ￿ 0:
10By Proposition 2, one can rank egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms according to the
maximal budget de￿cit (or the minimal budget surplus) they may generate. Hence, the center
can select the mechanism that ￿ts in its targets regarding the bounds on de￿cit or surplus.
Moreover, among all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms that respect a given upper
bound T on de￿cit (that is among all mechanisms in S￿ such that ￿ ￿ T
jNj), the ones for which
(10) holds as an equality Pareto-dominates the others.8 These Pareto-dominant mechanisms are
also the ones which have the minimal surplus.
Corollary 3. (i) Mechanisms in S
T
jNj Pareto-dominate all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mech-
anisms that satisfy T￿bounded-de￿cit.
Mechanisms in S
T
jNj have minimal surplus among all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms
that satisfy T￿bounded-de￿cit.
(ii) Mechanisms in S0 Pareto-dominate all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms that gen-
erate no-de￿cit.
Mechanisms in S0 have minimal surplus among all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms
that generate no-de￿cit.
Besides the bounds on de￿cit, the center may also be interested in bounds on the welfare of
the agents. The following welfare lower bound incorporates the notion that it is unfair for an
agent, if the agent is assigned all the tasks but has to pay the center. Hence, the utility an agent
would experience if she was assigned all of the tasks and zero transfer should be a lower-bound
on her welfare.
The Stand-Alone Lower-Bound: For each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; u(’i(c);ci) ￿ ￿ci(A):
The following result follows from Proposition 2b in Yengin (2010b).
Remark 4. A Groves mechanism satis￿es the stand-alone lower-bound and no-de￿cit if and
only if it belongs to S0:
5 Other Fairness Notions and Logical Relations
When assignment-e￿ciency and strategy-proofness are imposed, several logical relations hold
between fairness de￿nitions that do not exist otherwise. Before we state these logical relations,
let us present these de￿nitions.
Perhaps, the most basic fairness notion is to require that whenever two agents have the same
characteristics (e.g., the same cost functions), they should be treated equally.
Equal Treatment of Equals: For each pair fi;jg ￿ N and each c 2 CN such that ci = cj;
u(’i(c);ci) = u(’j(c);cj):
The following property requires that the allocation is invariant with respect to the relabelling
of agents.
Anonymity: For each bijection ￿ : N ! N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN;
’i(c) = ’￿(i)((c￿(j))j2N):
8Let c 2 C









i;ci) with strict inequality for some i 2 N: The mechanism ’ Pareto-dominates ’
0 if
for each c 2 C
N and each i 2 N, u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’
0
i(c);ci) and there are c 2 C




11Note that if a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is anonymous, then, for each pair fi;jg ￿ N; hi = hj:
Obviously, anonymity implies equal treatment of equals. However, for Groves mechanisms, we
show in Proposition 3i that these two properties actually characterize the same class.
Suppose that for each subset of tasks, agent i incurs a cost that is at least as high as what
agent j incurs. If j were assigned a lower utility than i, it would be as if j were penalized for
having lower costs. The following property is meant to prevent this situation.
If ci(A) ￿ cj(A) for each A 2 2A; then we write ci ￿ cj:
Order Preservation9: For each pair fi;jg ￿ N and each c 2 CN such that ci ￿ cj;
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);cj):
Another central fairness notion is that, each agent should ￿nd her bundle at least as desirable
as the bundle of any other agent (Foley, 1967).
No-envy: For each pair fi;jg ￿ N and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);ci):
P￿ apai (2003)10 proves that on the unrestricted domain, no Groves mechanism is envy-free.
On the subadditive domain of cost pro￿les11, she characterizes the class of envy-free Groves
mechanisms. It is easy to see that in general, no-envy implies equal treatment of equals. Ob-
servation 3 in P￿ apai (2003) states that all envy-free Groves mechanism are anonymous. We
show further that under assignment-e￿ciency and strategy-proofness, no-envy implies order
preservation, which in turn implies anonymity.
The following Proposition states the inclusion relations between several classes of Groves
mechanisms.
Proposition 3. (i) A Groves mechanism satis￿es equal treatment of equals if and only if it is
anonymous.
(ii) If a Groves mechanism preserves order, then it is anonymous.
(iii) If a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent, then it preserves order.
(iv) If a Groves mechanism is envy-free, then it preserves order.
(v) If a Groves mechanism is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent, then on the additive and the subadditive
domains, it is envy-free.
An alternative statement of Proposition 3ii is as follows: assignment-e￿ciency, strategy-
proofness, and order preservation together imply anonymity. Other parts of Proposition 3 can
also be stated in a similar way.
9The same property appears in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008). Also, a similar property appears in Porter,
Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2004) under the name of \no- competence penalty".
10P￿ apai (2003) studies envy-free Groves mechanisms in the same model as ours. The only immaterial di￿erence
between her model and ours is that in her model, objects are desirable. Her results still hold if we adapt them to
our costly objects setting.
11If for each pair fA;A
0g ￿ 2
A, ci(A [ A
0) ￿ (=) ci(A) + ci(A
0), then ci is subadditive (additive).
126 Concluding Remarks
In Section 3, we saw that even though in general, egalitarian-equivalence is a weaker requirement
than A￿egalitarian-equivalence, for Groves mechanisms, these two requirements are identical.
This result simpli￿es the design of egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms. The transfers of
an A￿egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism Gh;￿ have the following form: for each c 2 CN
and each i 2 N,
t
h;￿





= ￿ + ci(A￿




This transfer has two parts: ￿rst, i receives a ￿xed payment ￿ from the center. Then, she
receives the sum of the di￿erences in the cost of each agent j 2 Nnfig to perform A and j’s
assigned task A￿
j(c): One can interpret this transfer as follows:
Each agent i is held responsible for her cost of performing the reference set of tasks A; hence
each agent i pays the cost ci(A) and is reimbursed for her actual cost ci(A￿
i (c)): Hence, agents
are treated as if they are assigned the same set of tasks A. As a result, the center pays to agents








di￿erence between these two amounts is paid back to each agent as a rebate. Also, the center
collects from each agent, a lump-sum tax of ￿￿ (note that ￿ can be negative):
The results in Section 4 indicate that if the center wants to use a Pareto-dominant egalitarian-
equivalent Groves mechanism that restricts the budget de￿cit to be no more than an amount
T 2 R; then the reference set of tasks A has to be ; and ￿ = T=n: Such a mechanism would
be envy-free on the additive and the subadditive domains, due to Proposition 3v in Section 5.
Also, any egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism is anonymous and order-preserving. Hence,
egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms satisfy other appealing fairness notions as well and
can be designed to limit budget de￿cits.
Let us compare the mechanisms characterized in our paper with other classes of Groves
mechanisms characterized in the literature. It is easy to see that the class of k￿fair mechanisms
introduced by Porter et al (2004) and characterized by Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) is disjoint
with the class of egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms (just compare the respective transfer
functions). There is no inclusion relationship between the class of egalitarian-equivalent Groves
mechanisms and the class of envy-free Groves mechanisms characterized by P￿ apai (2003) on the
subadditive domain. However, Yengin (2010a) shows that on the subadditive domain, if a Groves
mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free, then (i) on the domain of economies with at
least three agents, it is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent, (ii) on the domain of two-agent economies, it
is either ;￿egalitarian-equivalent or A￿egalitarian-equivalent.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We ￿rst show that each GR;￿;￿ 2 G is egalitarian-equivalent: Let GR;￿;￿ = Gh;￿: Then, h satis￿es




13Then, for each c 2 CN; each i 2 N, and each ￿i 2 ￿i; since c￿i;i = c; by (8), we have




= ￿W(c) + ￿ +
X
j2Nnfig
cj(R(c￿i;j)) + ci(R(c￿i;i)) ￿ ci(R(c)):
= r(c) ￿ ci(R(c)): (11)
Hence, by Lemma 1 and (11), for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; there is a set of tasks R(c) and
a transfer r(c) such that u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = u(R(c);r(c);ci): Hence, Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent.
Now, we show that each egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism must belong to G: Let Gh;￿ be
an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism. By Lemma 2, there are R : CN!2A and r : CN!R
such that (1) holds. Let c 2 CN:





ci if ￿(i) ￿ ￿(j) ￿ 1,
c0
i if ￿(i) > ￿(j) ￿ 1:
Note that for each ￿ 2 ￿ and each j 2 N; c
￿;j








By (1), for each ￿ 2 ￿ and each j 2 N;
hj(c
￿;j
￿j) = W(c￿;j) + r(c￿;j) ￿ cj(R(c￿;j)); and (12)
hj(b
￿;j
￿j) = W(b￿;j) + r(b￿;j) ￿ c0
j(R(b￿;j)): (13)




￿j; by (12) and (13),
r(c￿;j) = ￿W(c￿;j) + W(b￿;j) + r(b￿;j) + cj(R(c￿;j)) ￿ c0
j(R(b￿;j)): (14)
Starting from c0; we reach c using the n￿step process described in Section 3. At each step
k ￿ n; ￿nd r(c￿;j) with ￿(j) = k:
Note that at each step k ￿ n; for each pair fj;lg ￿ N such that ￿(j) = k = ￿(l) + 1; we have
b￿;j = c￿;l:
Hence, at each step k ￿ n; in equation (14), instead of r(b￿;j); insert the value of r(c￿;l) found
at step k ￿ 1:
Note that for each j 2 N with ￿(j) = 1; b￿;j = c0; and for each j 2 N with ￿(j) = n; c￿;j = c:
Hence, by recursive substitution of (14), we obtain for each ￿ 2 ￿;












Since (15) holds for any ￿ 2 ￿; we have for each pair f￿;￿0g ￿ ￿;
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿;j)) = r(c) +
W(c) ￿ r(c0) =
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿0;j)): Hence, R 2 R: Let ￿ = r(c0): By Lemma 2 and (15), for each
￿ 2 ￿;
hi(c￿i) = W(c) + r(c) ￿ ci(R(c)) = ￿ +
X
j2N
cj(R(c￿;j)) ￿ ci(R(c)): (16)
14If we use ￿i 2 ￿i in (16), since c￿i;i = c; we obtain (8). Hence, Gh;￿ 2 G. This completes the
proof. ￿
Proof of Theorem 1:
Obviously, if a Groves mechanism is A￿egalitarian-equivalent for some A 2 2A, then it is
egalitarian-equivalent.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be egalitarian-equivalent. Then, by Lemma 3, (7) holds. Let R 2 R and
￿ 2 R be such that (7) holds:
Pick c￿




Let A ￿ R(c￿
1;c0
￿1): We will show that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N;




The proof is in two parts. Let c 2 CN:
Part 1:
Let ￿1 2 ￿1: Note that for each j 2 Nnf1g; c￿1;j = (c0
1;c
￿1;j

















￿1 )) ￿ cj(Aj)g:
Let ’ = maxfj’j;j’jg and ￿ = ’ + 1 > 0: Hence, ￿ > j’j and ￿ > j’j: Then, for each
fAj : j 2 Nnf1gg ￿ 2A;






￿1 )) ￿ cj(Aj)g ￿ ’ < ￿: (18)
Note that ￿ depends on c￿1; but not on c1:
Let f : 2Anf;g ! f1;2;:::;2jAj ￿ 1g be a bijection.
Let e c1 2 C be such that for each A 2 2Anf;g; e c1(A) = f(A)￿:
Note that for each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A with A 6= A0; since f(A) 6= f(A0);
je c1(A) ￿ e c1(A0)j ￿ ￿ and e c1(A) 6= e c1(A0): (19)
Let e c = (e c1;c￿1): Note that for each j 2 Nnf1g; (c0
1;c
￿1;j
￿1 ) = e c ￿1;j: Hence, by (18) and (19), for
each l 2 Nnf1g; each ￿l 2 ￿l; and each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A with A 6= A0;
je c1(A) ￿ e c1(A0)j ￿ ￿ > j
X
j2Nnf1g
[cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) ￿ cj(R(e c ￿l; j)]j:
That is, if A 6= A0; then for each l 2 Nnf1g and each ￿l 2 ￿l; e c1(A) ￿ e c1(A0) 6= P
j2Nnf1g
[cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) ￿ cj(R(e c ￿l; j))]:
15Hence, e c1(A) ￿ e c1(A0) =
P
j2Nnf1g
[cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) ￿ cj(R(e c ￿l; j))] implies that
A = A0 and
X
j2Nnf1g
cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) =
X
j2Nnf1g
cj(R(e c ￿l; j)): (20)
Since R 2 R; by (6), for each l 2 Nnf1g and each ￿l 2 ￿l;
P
j2N
e cj(R(e c ￿l; j)) =
P
j2N
e cj(R(e c ￿1; j)).
By rearranging this equality,
e c1(R(e c ￿l; 1)) ￿ e c1(R(e c)) =
X
j2Nnf1g
[cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) ￿ cj(R(e c ￿l; j))]:
This equality and (20) together imply that for each l 2 Nnf1g and each ￿l 2 ￿l;
R(e c ￿l; 1) = R(e c) and
X
j2Nnf1g
cj(R(e c ￿1; j)) =
X
j2Nnf1g
cj(R(e c ￿l; j)): (21)
By abuse of notation, let us represent a permutation ￿ 2 ￿ as a list that shows the ordering
of the agents: ￿ = (￿￿1(1);￿￿1(2);:::;￿￿1(n)): For instance, if ￿ = (i;j); then ￿(i) = 1 and
￿(j) = 2:
Consider e ￿n = (1;2;3;4;:::;n): Note that e c e ￿n; n = e c and for each j 2 Nnf1g; e cj = cj. By (21),
R(e c e ￿n; 1) = R(e c): Hence, by (7),
h1(e c￿1) = ￿ + e c1(R(e c e ￿n; 1)) +
X
j2Nnf1;ng




cj(R(e c e ￿n; j)) + cn(R(e c)): (22)
Claim: For each j 2 Nnf1;ng; there exists ￿n 2 ￿n such that
e c e ￿n; j = e c ￿n; 1: (23)
Proof of Claim: Let j 2 Nnf1;ng: Then, e c e ￿n; j = (e c1;c2;c3;:::;cj;c0
j+1;:::;c0
n): Let ￿n =
(2;3;:::;j;1;j + 1;:::;n): Then, e c ￿n; 1 = e c e ￿n; j:
By (21), for each ￿n 2 ￿n; R(e c ￿n; 1) = R(e c): This equality and (23) together imply that for each
j 2 Nnf1;ng; R(e c e ￿n; j) = R(e c): Hence, by (22), h1(e c￿1) = ￿ +
P
j2Nnf1g
cj(R(e c)): This equality
and the fact that c￿1 = e c￿1 together imply that





Let i 2 Nnf1g and ￿i 2 ￿i: Note that for each j 2 Nnfig; c￿i;j = (c0
i;c
￿i;j

















￿i )) ￿ cj(Aj)g:












+ 1 > 0: (25)
Let g : 2Anf;g ! f1;2;:::;2jAj ￿ 1g be a bijection.
For each A 2 2Anf;g; let b ci(A) = g(A)￿:
Let b c = (b ci;c￿i): Note that for each j 2 Nnfig; (c0
i;c
￿i;j
￿i ) = b c ￿i; j:
Similar to Part 1, by (25), for each l 2 Nnfig; each ￿l 2 ￿l; and each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A with
A 6= A0;
jb ci(A0) ￿ b ci(A)j ￿ ￿ > maxfj
P
j2Nnfig
[cj(R(b c ￿i; j)) ￿ cj(R(b c ￿l; j)]j; je c1(R(e c1;c0






Hence, b ci(A) ￿ b ci(A0) =
P
j2Nnfig
[cj(R(b c ￿i; j)) ￿ cj(R(b c ￿l; j)] implies that
A = A0 and
X
j2Nnfig
cj(R(b c ￿i; j)) =
X
j2Nnfig
cj(R(b c ￿l; j): (26)
and b ci(A0) ￿ b ci(A) = e c1(R(e c1;c0
￿1)) ￿ e c1(A) implies that
A = A0 and e c1(R(e c1;c0
￿1)) = e c1(A): (27)










Part 2a: Since R 2 R; by (6), for each l 2 Nnfig and each ￿l 2 ￿l,
P
j2N
b cj(R(b c ￿l; j)) =
P
j2N
b cj(R(b c ￿i; j)). That is,
b ci(R(b c ￿l; i)) ￿ b ci(R(b c)) =
X
j2Nnfig
[cj(R(b c ￿i; j)) ￿ cj(R(b c ￿l; j))].
This equality and (26) together imply that for each l 2 Nnfig and each ￿l 2 ￿l,
R(b c ￿l; i) = R(b c): (29)
Consider Part 1 that follows after equation (21). By a parallel argument to that part (instead
of e ￿n; use b ￿1 with b ￿1(i) = 1)), using (29), we obtain




Part 2b: Consider c = (e c1;b ci;c0
￿f1;ig) and c = (c￿
1;b ci;c0
￿f1;ig):
17Let ￿1 2 ￿1 be such that ￿1(i) = n￿1 (e.g., if i = 2; then ￿1 = (3;4;:::;n;i;1)): Let ￿i 2 ￿i be
such that ￿i(1) = n ￿ 1: By (6),
X
j2N
cj(R(c ￿1; j)) =
X
j2N









Since for each j 2 Nnf1;ig; cj = cj = c0
j; by rearranging (31),
b ci(R(b ci;c0
￿i)) ￿ b ci(R(c)) = e c1(R(e c1;c0
￿1)) ￿ e c1(R(c)); and (32)
b ci(R(b ci;c0





Equalities (27) and (32) together imply R(b ci;c0
￿i) = R(c) and e c1(R(e c1;c0
￿1)) = e c1(R(c)): These
equalities and (19) together imply
R(b ci;c0
￿i) = R(e c1;c0
￿1) = R(c): (34)
Similarly, (28) and (33) together imply R(b ci;c0









￿1) = R(c): (35)
Consider b ￿1 2 ￿1 such that b ￿1(i) = 1: Then,
b c b ￿1; i = (b ci;c0
￿i): (36)
By (29), R(b c b ￿1; i) = R(b ci;c￿i): Hence, by (36),
R(b ci;c0
￿i) = R(b ci;c￿i): (37)
Consider e ￿n 2 ￿n such that e ￿n(1) = 1: Then,
e c e ￿n; 1 = (e c1;c0
￿1): (38)
By (21), R(e c e ￿n; 1) = R(e c1;c￿1): Hence, by (38),
R(e c1;c0
￿1) = R(e c1;c￿1): (39)
By (34), (35), (37), and (39),





￿1) = A: Then, by (24), (30), and (40), for each i 2 N;






￿1) is independent of c 2 CN; and we applied Parts 1 and 2 to an arbitrary c 2 CN;
for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N; hi(c￿i) = ￿ +
P
j2Nnfig
cj(A): Hence, Gh;￿ is A￿egalitarian-
equivalent. ￿
18Proof of Proposition 2:
Let T 2 R; ￿ 2 R; Gh;￿ 2 S￿; and ￿ ￿ T
jNj: By (9), Gh;￿ is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent. Note that




i (c) = ￿(n ￿ 1)W(c) + n￿:






i (c) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1)W(c) + T ￿ T: Hence, Gh;￿ satis￿es T￿bounded-de￿cit.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism that satis￿es T￿bounded-
de￿cit.





i (c) = ￿(n ￿ 1)W(c) +
X
i2N
hi(c￿i) ￿ T: (42)
By Theorem 1, there is A 2 2A such that Gh;￿ 2 GA: By (9) and (42), there is ￿ 2 R such














cj(A); for each c 2 CN,
X
j2N




If c = c0, then the left-hand-side of inequality (43) is 0: Hence, there is " ￿ 0 such that " =
T￿n￿
(n￿1):
Then, by (43), for each c 2 CN;
X
j2N
cj(A) ￿ " + W(c): (44)
Let fi;lg ￿ N and b c 2 CN be such that for each A 2 2Anf;g; b ci(A) > " and b cl(A) = 0: Then,
for each A 2 2Anf;g;
X
j2N
b cj(A) > " and W(b c) = b cl(A) = 0: Thus, by (44), A = ;: That is, Gh;￿
is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent. Then, by (9), Gh;￿ 2 S￿:
Since Gh;￿ is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent, then, by (43), for each c 2 CN,
n￿ ￿ T ￿ (n ￿ 1)W(c): (45)
That is, n￿ ￿ T ￿ min
c2CN f(n ￿ 1)W(c)g: Since min
c2CNW(c) = W(c0) = 0; by (45), we have ￿ ￿ T
n:
This completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Corollary 3:
(i) Let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that satis￿es egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded-
de￿cit. By Proposition 2, Gh;￿ is such that for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N, hi(c￿i) = ￿ ￿ T
jNj:
Then, by Lemma 1, u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c) + ￿: Since utility is increasing in ￿; Gh;￿ Pareto-
dominates all Groves mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded-de￿cit if
and only if ￿ = T
jNj: That is, Gh;￿ 2 S
T
jNj:









the surplus is minimal if and only if
P
i2N
hi(c￿i) is maximal. Note that
P
i2N
hi(c￿i) is maximal if
19and only if ￿ = T
jNj: Hence, Gh;￿ generates minimal surplus among all Groves mechanisms that
satisfy egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded-de￿cit if and only if Gh;￿ 2 S
T
jNj:
(ii) The proof follows from part (i) and the fact that no-de￿cit is T￿bounded-de￿cit where
T = 0: ￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) It is easy to see that anonymity implies equal treatment of equals. Conversely, let Gh;￿ be
Groves mechanism that satis￿es equal treatment of equals. Let c 2 CN: We will show that for
each i 2 N and each bijection ￿ : N ! N; hi(c￿i) = h￿(i)(￿(c)￿￿(i)) where ￿(c) ￿ (c￿(l))l2N:
Let fi;jg ￿ N and b c 2 CN be such that b ci = cj and b c￿i = c￿i: Since b ci = b cj; by equal treatment
of equals and Lemma 1,
hi(b c￿i) = hj(b c￿j): (46)
Next, let ￿0 : N ! N be a bijection such that ￿0(i) = j; ￿0(j) = i; and for each
l 2 Nnfi;jg; ￿0(l) = l: Let ￿0(c) ￿ (c￿0(l))l2N: Note that b c = ￿0(b c): Hence, b c￿j = ￿0(b c)￿￿0(i) =
￿0(c)￿￿0(i): These equalities, (46), and the fact that b c￿i = c￿i together imply that hi(c￿i) =
h￿0(i)(￿0(c)￿￿0(i)): Note that for any bijection ￿ : N ! N; starting from c; we can obtain ￿(c)
by carrying out of a ￿nite sequence of pair-wise switching of labels of two agents one of whom
is always in the ith position. Hence, Gh;￿ is anonymous.
(ii) Let Gh;￿ be an order preserving Groves mechanism. Since order preservation implies equal
treatment of equals, by Proposition 3 (i), Gh;￿ is anonymous.
(iii) Let Gh;￿ be an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism. Let fi;jg ￿ N and c 2 CN be
such that ci ￿ cj: Then, by (7) (which is equivalent to (8)), hi(c￿i) ￿ hj(c￿j): By Lemma 1,
Gh;￿ preserves order.
(iv) Let Gh;￿ be an envy-free Groves mechanism. Assume, by contradiction, that Gh;￿ does not





j (c);cj): By Lemma 1, hi(c￿i) > hj(c￿j): Then,
ci(A￿
i (c)) ￿ W(c) + hi(c￿i) > cj(A￿
i (c)) ￿ W(c) + hj(c￿j);
￿cj(A￿
i (c)) ￿ [W(c) ￿ ci(A￿
i (c))] + hi(c￿i) > ￿W(c) + hj(c￿j);
￿cj(A￿
i (c)) + t
h;￿
i (c) > ￿W(c) + hj(c￿j):
This inequality and Lemma 1 together imply u(G
h;￿
i (c);cj) > u(G
h;￿
j (c);cj); which contradicts
no-envy.
(v) Let Gh;￿ be an ;￿egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism. Let Cad be the domain of
additive cost functions and Csub be the subadditive domain. Let C 2 fCad;Csubg: Assume, by
contradiction, that Gh;￿ is not envy-free on C. Then, there are fi;jg ￿ N and c 2 CN such that
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) < u(G
h;￿
j (c);ci): This inequality and Lemma 1 together imply




By ;￿egalitarian-equivalence and Corollary 1, there is ￿ 2 R such that
hi(c￿i) = hj(c￿j) = ￿: (48)
By Lemma 1, ￿cj(A￿
j(c)) + t
h;￿





i (c)) + ci(A￿
j(c)) < ci(A￿
i (c)) + cj(A￿
j(c)): (49)
20Note that on the subadditive domain, ci(A￿
i (c) [ A￿
j(c)) ￿ ci(A￿
i (c)) + ci(A￿
j(c)); which holds
as an equality on the additive domain. This inequality and (49) together imply that it is less
costly to assign both A￿
i (c) and A￿
j(c) to agent i rather than assigning these sets to i and j;
respectively. This contradicts that A￿(c) is an e￿cient assignment. ￿
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